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Abstract
While the predominant effects of urban renewal are indisputably positive, the
compulsory relocation that it generates in parallel can have serious adverse
effects. The loss of dwelling and assets, and the uprooting from an existing
pattern of livelihood carry high impoverishment risks for those affected
directly. Much suffering is caused because most of the relocations reviewed
involved displacement over large distances. The loss of jobs are often
compensated by alternative sources of income in or near the relocation site.
In addition to the tangible economic losses, there are social and cultural
disruptions in neighborhood ties and kinship networks. These non-
quantifiable social and economic costs include the loss of access to mutual help,
child care arrangements, exchange and borrowing opportunities, and other
informal support mechanisms. As the communities relocated tend to be from
the lower income segments of the society, the social and economic costs of
relocation are also most severely felt by these communities.
Two case studies in the Philippines indicates that residents have not yet
recovered the standard of living that they enjoyed prior to relocation.
Although this "transitional stage" is generally assumed to last only up to 2-3
years after relocation, residents at the one of the case sites are still at this stage
three years after the relocation. The major reason is that compensation
mechanisms, particularly livelihood programs, have been dismal. The
outcome is not surprising in view of the fact that the projects were
implemented from the perspective of concerned government relocation
authority and not based on the real needs of the affected communities. The
participation of the relocatees in the planning and implementation was very
limited or non-existent.
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Title: Associate Professor of Political Economy and Planning
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank:
The people in the Philippines for sharing their opinions and insights in ways
that made unraveling this story and piecing it together a terrific learning
experience.
Mr. Froilan Kanpitan, Ms. Maria Fe Pesebre, Ms. Jasmin Restan, and Ms. Sally
A. Sarmiento at the National Housing Authority (NHA); Mr. Isauro
Pumurada, Mr. Rosauro T. Oracion and Mr. Ferdinand De Luna at the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); for providing
institutional support for my research and giving so unstintingly of their time,
energy and opinions.
Associate Professor Paul Smoke for his invaluable guidance, being the most
supportive advisor imaginable, and more importantly for his encouragement
over my past two years at MIT.
Professor Reinhard Goethert for his moral support and insightful comments.
The International Development Center of Japan and the Engineering
Consulting Firms Association, Japan for making this terrific two years at MIT
possible.
All my friends in Manila, especially Edna for being so accommodating and
being such a wonderful friend; Tito for first introducing me to Dasmarifias and
for aspiring me with his amazing dedication and commitment to community
development; and Em for his long-distance support.
All other friends at MIT, especially Darren, Tomoko, and Yew Mui for sharing
good times. Special thanks to Zul for showing an amazing level of patience and
for always being there.
This is to my parents.
List of Acronyms
BOI:
DA:
DANIDA:
DBB:
DENR:
DOLE:
DPWH:
DSWD:
FVR:
GMA:
GMACCO:
GSIS:
HIGC:
HUDCC:
LGU:
MRBs:
NAIA:
NCR:
NEDA:
NGO:
NHA:
NHMFC:
NSO:
OECF:
PRRP:
SSS:
UDHA:
UPA:
USAID:
Board of Investment
Department of Agriculture
Danish International Development Agency
Dasmarinlas Bagong Bayan
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Department of Labor and Employment
Department of Public Works and Highways
Department of Social Welfare and Development
Family Village Resources
General Mariano Alvarez
General Mariano Alvarez Credit Cooperative
Government Service Insurance System
Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
Local Government Units
Medium Rise Buildings
Ninoy Aquino International Airport
National Capital Region
National Economic and Development Authority
Non-governmental Organization
National Housing Authority
National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation
National Statistics Office
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, Japan
Pasig River Rehabilitation Project
Social Security System
Urban Development and Housing Law (RA 7279)
Urban Poor Associate
United States Agency of International Development
(US$1=26 pesos)
Table of Contents
A b stract ............................................................................................................................ 2
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................. 3
List of Acronyms....................................................................................................... 4
T able of Contents....................................................................................................... 5
Chapter 1. Introduction........................................................................................... 6
1-1. Objectives of the Study..........................................................................7
1-2. Structure of the Study.......................................................................... 9
1-3. Methodology and Limitations of the Study..................................... 9
Chapter 2. Urban Population Displacement and Relocation........................ 13
2-1. The Causes of Urban Displacement and Relocation.....................13
2-2. What Makes the Urban Relocation Different?..............................15
2-2-1. Urbanization in Metro Manila......................................... 15
2-2-2. History of Urban Relocation .............................................. 17
2-2-3. Urban Poverty and Roles of the City................................ 20
Chapter 3. Case Studies in the Philippines ........................................................ 22
3-1. Case-1: Bautista in Dasmarifas, Cavite............................................22
3-1-1. General Project Outline...................................................... 22
3-1-2. Problems - Basic Services, Livelihood ............................. 24
3-2. Case-2: Family Village Resources (FVR), Cavite .......................... 31
3-2-1. General Outline of Project................................................. 31
3-2-2. Problems - Basic Services, Livelihood, and Housing ........ 33
3-3. General Lessons ................................................................................... 40
3-3-1. Economic Repercussions ................................................... 40
3-3-2. Morbidity and Food Insecurity ......................................... 42
3-3-3. Social Disarticulation........................................................... 43
3-3-4. Housing Conditions............................................................. 44
3-3-5. Management Issues.............................................................. 46
Chapter 4.
4-1.
4-2.
4-3.
Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................. 48
Summary of Evaluations of the Relocation Projects....................48
Recommendations for the Filipino Government Agencies...........49
Research Q uestions............................................................................ 58
Bibliography............................................................................................................ 60
Appendix.......................................................................................................................62
Chapter 1. Introduction
Dramatic population increases are forcasted to take place in the world's urban
areas in general, and in the mega-cities of the Third World in particular. The
urban population of the Third World is projected to increase from 675 million
in 1970 to 1.9 billion in the year 2000 and 4 billion in the year 2025. Such urban
growth requires the reordering of city spaces, improvements in transportation
networks, development of new industrial estates, expansion in new water and
sewage systems, and substantial growth in environmental services. The
dramatic increase in investments in basic urban infrastructure and equipment
will have significant impact on land use and settlement patterns. One of the
most important forces of change in the these third world cities will be the
process of compulsory relocation of urban population within cities and to the
urban fringe.
Relocation of urban population is not a new phenomenon. However, it is
likely that the involuntary displacement of urban population will become
more significant than it has ever been in the Philippines. The obligation to
improve resettlement practices is becoming even more imperative in the
Philippine's urban agenda.
Urban relocation raises many important issues. The literature on resettlement
has sought to draw attention to the trauma and disruption associated with
displacement, such as loss of livelihood, destruction of home, dissolution of
social and economic networks, increased stress and higher mortality rates.
However, governments' compensation and assistance to people subjected to
involuntary resettlement has been unsatisfactory in many instances, and they
have been unable to restore the social and economic well-being of the displaced
population (Cernea, 1988).
Besides these inherent adverse impacts of resettlement, the literature suggests
that there are common management problems. Cernea (1990) pointed out that
the issue of resettlement exists in a 'policy vacuum,' which results in ad-hoc
treatment of the problems, insufficient resource allocation, under-planning
and poor execution. Although resettlement is a complex operation that
requires authority and institutional strength (V. Q.Adu-Aryee, 1933 quoted by
Hiroko Tanaka), many agencies are low-level bureaucracies and are not well
equipped to consider a wide range of economic and socio-cultural variables in
planning resettlement projects.
Public agencies in the Philippines, particularly the National Housing
Authority, seem to have difficulties in directly tackling these widely recognized
problems associated with involuntary resettlement issues. Thus, 50 - 60% of
these projects end up abandoned. The increasing significance and frequency of
resettlement projects makes it essential to understand more thoroughly the
workable and unworkable elements of these projects. This would help public
agencies to formulate effective policy and to search for improved practical
solutions to the problems of resettlement.
1-1. Objectives of the Study
The objectives of this thesis are three-fold. Firstly, I want to understand the
factors and traits that underlie successful relocation projects. Secondly, I hope to
understand how the relocation process affects the population and the duration
of these effects. With this information, policy makers and government officials
could improve their support and assistance to relocation projects. Thirdly, I
want to identify relevant patterns of behavior and to suggest the policy and
program actions that could counter the risks. This assumes that the people and
socio-cultural systems respond to involuntary relocation in predictable ways
and their adverse effects on population are not inevitable.
This thesis is primarily intended for the policy makers, project officers and
concerned non-governmental organizations (NGO) workers of the Philippines
and also for development practitioners in Japan. Japan has been the leading aid
donor in the Philippines, and the majority of the projects funded by Overseas
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) have resulted in population resettlement.
The OECF and the Government of Japan have started to recognize their
responsibilities as donors and have made some serious efforts to ensure an
appropriate resettlement process. However, there are many issues left
untackled. It is my hope that this study can promote improved understanding
of the issues surrounding population displacement and relocation and could be
used for the betterment of project planning.
1-2. Structure of the Study
In Chapter Two, I will outline a brief history of urban displacement and
relocation in the Philippines and highlighted their causal factors. Chapter
Three analyses the two case study projects in the Philippines and describes the
problems commonly encountered in urban relocation projects. Special
attention is paid to the socio-economic consequences of relocation, particularly
relocatees' economic and employment opportunities and housing issues.
Finally, Chapter Four summarizes my evaluation of the two cases. I also
present recommendations for the concerned agencies in the Philippines based
on the analysis of the two resettlement projects.
1-3. Methodology and Limitations of the Study
Relocation literature points out that both forced and voluntary low-income
migrants to government-sponsored settlements are more apt to lose control
over their new physical and social environments. In contrast, the high-income
and the self-relocated have a better chance to exert control over their new
environments. This indicates that the rich and poor react differently to
relocation and that those who have a choice about where and when and how to
relocate may fare best. While the predominant effects of urban renewal are
positive for many urban inhabitants, the compulsory relocation that it
generates in parallel has serious adverse effects. As the re-located communities
tend to be some of the poorest segments of the city population, the social and
economic costs of relocation are also likely be most severely felt by these
communities. There is a high risk that these low-income groups will be further
impoverished in the process. In this paper, I will focus on only a certain
segment of affected population: low income households. For those households,
a central location with access to income-generating opportunities is crucial.
They also have little control over the options for resettlement. It is noted,
however, those who could benefit from relocation programs and much better
off than non-beneficiaries who are sharers and renters of a housing unit.
For the purpose of this study, I examined two relocation projects designed and
implemented by national government agencies in the Philippines. One is
developed by the National Housing Authority (NHA) in Area D, Bagong Barrio
- Bautista, Dasmarifnas, Cavite (Bautista). The other is Family Village Resources
(FVR) at Barangay1 Kabilang Baybay, Town of General Mariano Alvarez
(GMA), Cavite, developed by the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) in 1992. There are three major reasons I have decided to choose these
two specific project sites;
(1) One of the objectives of this study is to understand how relocation affects
population and the duration of the effects. Some relocation researchers
believe that people and socio-cultural systems respond to forced relocation
in predictable ways. They argue that predictability is possible because of the
extremely stressful nature of relocation. This limits the range of available
responses to cope with the situation immediately following relocation.
Also, they tend to believe that it would generally take two to three years for
relocatees to get adjusted in a new environment and replicate their
previous standard of living. By making a comparison between the FVR,
which was developed four years ago with the relatively new Bautista, I hope
to be able to determine the different coping strategies and resulting needs
that are dependent on the stage of resettlement scheme.
1 It is the basic political unit. Every citizen is a member of a barangay assembly that meets to discuss national
and local issues, a system that encourge grassroots participation.
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(2) The people affected by the Pasig River Rehabilitation Project (PRRP)2 were
mainly relocated to Bautista. However, some of the affected people were
relocated to FVR. I thought I could examine how the people relocated from
the same area would be affected by the different resettlement strategies of
the implementing agencies. With this information, I could then make
some comparative assessments of the two concerned agencies, NHA and
DPWH.
(3) Cavite is considered to be the fastest growth area in Central Luzon 3. As I
believe that a key to a successful relocation project is to provide livelihood
to the relocatees, I was interested to examine how this economic growth
could facilitate the integration of the relocatees into the local political
economy by providing employment in the neighboring communities.
I conducted interviews in the Philippines with government officials at the
NHA, the DPWH, NGOs, consultants, researchers and residents in the two
resettlement sites in January 1996. In addition to the information obtained
through these field interviews, I have also drawn insights from the
resettlement literature. However, although the literature on resettlement in
rural areas has grown considerably in recent decades, the question of what
happens when people living in cities are displaced by development projects
remains a relatively unstudied topic (Bartolome, 1993).
2 PRRP was set up in December 1989 and has a 10-year timetable. The lead agency is the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) with the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA).
The Program has two overall objectives: improvement in water quality and improvement in general
environmental conditions. The PRRP is a pet project of the First Lady, Mrs. Amelita M. Ramos.
3 The Province of Cavite is a part of the CALABARZON provinces.The project CALABARZON is a large-
scale, multi-sectoral project complex planned for Region IV, specifically covering the provinces of Cavite,
L aguna, BtangasRizal, and Quezon, assisted by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). It is
designed to transform agro-based rural economies through high industrialization led by foreign export-
processing type industries.
-11-
There are a number of limitations of this study. The first one arises from this
scarcity of research on urban relocation. Secondly, this study is limited by the
quality of material accessible as full cases. There is no available comprehensive
explanation by the concerned agencies of the context of the relocation, the
relocation process itself, its management, and follow-up actions over a number
of years. Therefore, this paper is based on my personal observations and
experiences of the living conditions in the two resettlement sites in Cavite.
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Chapter 2. Urban Population Displacement and Relocation
2-1. The Causes of Urban Displacement and Relocation
Urban population displacement is a subset of a broader spectrum of population
displacement. According to Cernea (1993), one important initial conceptual
distinction regarding population movements is between gradual migration, on
the one hand, and sudden and involuntary displacement, on the other.
Among processes of sudden displacement, the literature distinguishes three
main types, corresponding to the following three types of events: (1) natural
causes (earthquakes, floods); (2) political events (wars, revolutions and other
forms of political turmoil); and (3) planned development programs
(particularly infrastructural equipment). The types of population displacement
triggered by these events have many similar consequences. However, despite
certain common features, there is a basic difference between these
displacements depending on their causality. In cases of types (1) and (2),
displaced people are usually torn abruptly from their accustomed life. Their
attempts to return and reestablish themselves in familiar surroundings also
differ. On the other hand, type (3) displacements are planned and deliberate.
Realization of the goals of such development programs requires the removal of
those who are in the way. The point here is that, being known in advance, such
displacement can and must be subject to mitigatory planning. This includes
design and land use provisions likely to reduce the need to displace in the first
place. Thus, the explicit purpose of this paper is to deal with compulsory
resettlement caused specifically by planned development.
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Within this category, displacement can result from several distinct factors. The
types of deliberate displacements can be conceptually captured in a taxonomy of
the key causes of planned urban displacement. This takes into account current
and emerging trends in urbanization, social research carried out on city growth
and city roles (Kassarda and Rondinelli, 1990). The four major causes of urban
displacement identified by Cernea (1993) are;
" Urban Economic Growth: Relocation is used to make room for new
industrial estates, transportation corridors, economic ancillary activities, or
for other infrastructural equipment required for economic growth and
population agglomeration;
e Environmental Improvements: Relocation is caused by the need to make
room for structural and infrastructural equipment for environmental
services, health facilities, water supply systems, and others, and to place
them into already densely inhabited downtown or residential areas;
- Slum Upgrading: Social policies aimed at poverty alleviation and quality of
life improvement arrive at a point when they must address slum
conditions and change them. Sometimes slum upgrading cannot be carried
out without some population relocation; and
" Non-Urban Programs: Certain non-urban development projects infringe
upon existing urban settlements, requiring their full or partial relocation.
Actual relocation operations may result from a combination of two or more of
the above causes. These causes are often intertwined, even if one or the other
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remains the main trigger of a specific displacement. The upgrading of old
squatter areas will certainly continue and will entail a significant share of total
urban population relocation. Yet, it is predictable that the main causal factors
accounting for planned urban displacements will be related to the process of
urban economic growth and the need for urban environmental improvement.
I will thus examine resettlement operations resulting from these two sets of
processes -- urban growth and environmental improvement.
2-2. What Makes the Urban Relocation Different?
There are clearly problems inherent in urban relocation arising primarily from
the specific characteristics and patterns of city growth and city roles. These, in
practice, could make the planning problems associated with urban resettlement
differ substantially from those involved in most rural displacement; the
distance between place of residence and place of work, the role of cash in the
domestic economy, the political sophistication and access to decision making of
the urban poor, and the structure of urban versus rural communities, among
others.
2-2-1. Urbanization in Metro Manila 4
The Philippines has a population of 70.2 million people (NSO, 1995). Metro
Manila has a population of 10 million people and is projected to have 12.6
million by the year 2000 (PHIILSSA, 1994). It's overall annual growth rate in the
1980s was 3.5%, down from 5.2% in the 1970s (Murphy, 1993). It is expected to
decline to 3.3% in the 1990's. However, some observers believe that the hard
economic times over the last 10 years, the civil war in the countryside, a high
4 Eight cities and nine municipalities of the National Capital Region (NCR) is generally termed as Metro
Manila.
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Figure 1. Cities and Municipalities of Metro Manila
Source: ESCAP, Human Settlements Atlas, 1986
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national population growth rate of 2.4-2.6%, the failure to develop industry in
the rural areas, and natural disasters, such as the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo,
have swollen the streams of the poor coming to the urban centers. These
events have possibly resulted in a much higher rate of growth in the squatter
areas. The most striking feature in Metro Manila's urban scope is thus the
presence of these squatters and slum dwellers, which amount to some 4
million5 (NEDA, 1992), about 39% of the metropolis' total population, and
occupying only 5.3% of the total land area of the metropolis (PHIILSSA, 1994).
The process of urbanization in Metro Manila has occurred in a chaotic,
unplanned manner, and urban infrastructural facilities, as well as social
services, have lagged far behind population expansion. This has created a
bottleneck to further economic growth, lowered living standards and caused
major health, sanitation, and transportation problems (Cernea, 1989). In order
to address these metropolitan growth problems, the purpose of urban projects
that cause population displacement and relocation has shifted towards
reducing congestion in these areas and for providing space for the construction
of urban infrastructure.
2-2-2. History of Urban Relocation
The basic problem is that urban growth causes considerable increase in the
competition for scarce land in inner-city areas. This is reflected in high and
rising land values. All predictions indicate that the third-world cities will
continue to grow rapidly for the foreseeable future, suggesting a considerable
increase in this phenomenon. The urban poor, in particular, find great
5 The last accurate count of squatters in Metro Manila was done in 1980. There were 1.6 million people and the
estimate of the total squatter population now range from 3 to 4.5 million
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difficulty in competing for these locations and are often forced out. Because
slum removal by administrative decision has accounted for such a large
proportion of involuntary urban displacement, particularly in the Philippines,
it is useful to understand its history and mechanisms.
Various types of relocation have been implemented in the Philippines since
the early 1960s. National policies and programs dealing with slums and
squatters had started with uprooting squatter colonies and relocating them
outside Manila (Murphy, 1993). Such policies have been legally backed up by
the Presidential Decree 722, which penalizes any person who, by the use of
force, intimidation or threat or in the absence of the owner, occupies land. The
Philippines is one of only two countries in the world, along with South Africa,
which makes squatting a criminal offense.
In the 1970s, on-site and off-site development were introduced and are both
being utilized by cities in housing improvement for the urban poor. The most
massive and well-known program illustrating this approach was undertaken
in the Tondo Foreshore facing Manila Bay. However, in the process of such
upgrading programs, the squatters who did not qualify to be beneficiaries were
relocated to resettlement areas outside the capital. In many cases, poor
households have been forcibly evicted from their dwelling units, often without
any place to be relocated to. Although squatters have occupied the fringes and
the dangerous areas, settling where resistance is lowest and the threat of
eviction seemingly remote, the urban landscape is continuously evolving with
all lands subject to development. Therefore, all squatters are susceptible to
relocation. While evictions have been constantly witnessed in Metro Manila,
the number seemed to have decreased substantially. From 1986-1992, the years
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of Corazon Aquino's presidency, an average 100,000 urban poor squatters a year
were forcibly evicted in Metro Manila according to a study made by the Asian
Coalition for Housing Rights. That number has decreased to 24,000 a year under
the current President Ramos administration (Murphy, 1993).
There seem to be three major reasons for this relatively lower rate of evictions;
Firstly, the Urban Development and Housing Law (UDHA or Republic Act
7279) issued by the then President Aquino in April 1992 limits evictions, sets
guidelines for how they should be carried out, and, most importantly, make
evictions clearly illegal in the absence of relocation. If this law could be
effectively enforced, this could truly be a milestone in the country's long
history of forced evictions, demolitions, and relocation. One problematic
feature of UDHA is that it only applies to those squatters who constructed their
structures after March 28, 1992, the effective date of UDHA. Secondly, President
Ramos, who took office in October 1992, has signaled clearly to government
officials and the private sector that he is committed to the plight of the urban
poor and intends to strictly enforce UDHA. Thirdly, the government does not
have any relocation areas developed to house the displaced people.
There may, however, be a return to the massive evictions of the 1960-1992
period as there has been a persistent criticism that UDHA has become a major
obstacle to urban economic development. This will surely increase the number
of relocation projects to facilitate the implementation of urban renewal
projects. Several large and well-funded public works projects and private efforts
were stopped, including the Metro Manila Flood Control Project, the Nagtahan
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Bridge link road, and some of the urban road projects 6. Such disruptions to
public development projects are unlikely to continue indefinitely.
In this environment, the organized relocation of squatters and other city
residents to rural barangay was recently opted for by the government. This was
intended to decongest the increasingly urbanized and urbanizing areas and also
to make way for the construction of urban infrastructure. By 1992, about 328,000
families were relocated to five resettlement sites located approximately 25-40
km away from Metro Manila 7 (USAID, 1992). However, most types and
experiences of relocation in the Philippines have not been very successful. For
example, an abandonment rate of over 60% in the other NHA's projects at
Sapang Palay and Carmona, has been reported. The names of the major
relocation areas of Metro Manila, Bagong Silang (New Birth), Bagong Bayan
(New Village), suggest that these projects were meant to symbolize
government beneficence to the less fortunate. They were welfare projects rather
than an effort to integrate the beneficiaries into the political economy.
2-2-3. Urban Poverty and Roles of the City
The possibility of being expelled from their homes and communities fills most
slum dwellers with dread. Given the economic constraints under which they
operate, the inner-city slums are an extremely functional solution to most, if
not at all, of the slum-dwellers' major problems. The location of the slums
puts their residents within close range of the best job markets and affords
multiple opportunities for odd jobs in times of unemployment or financial
stress. As casual and non-permanent workers, they have relatively good
6 Interview with Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in January 1995.
7 The NHA has five resettlement areas, generally located with 35 km from Metro Manila. Resettlement areas: (1)
DBB, Cavite, (2) GMA, Cavite, (3) Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, (4) Sapang Palay, Bulacan, and (5) Bagong
Nayon, Antipolo, Rizal.
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chances to find a new job when their contract expires or when they are laid off.
Even if they fail, there is still a large informal economic sector that serves them
as a safety net for survival. It also places them at the very center of a wide
variety of urban services and benefits: free medical clinics, social services, even
schools. It gives them a sense of "being where the action is", which figures
highly in their satisfaction with urban life. Moreover, slums provide a
community where friends and neighbors can be counted on for mutual favors.
There is always someone to leave the children with, and food and staples can
be purchased on credit from sari-sari8 stores even at the time when there is no
income. This level of sharing may seem trivial, but it is of absolute importance
to those living on the margin of subsistence. For those who lack public
attention, it provides a minimal, community sponsored social security and
family welfare system. Such advantages are not easily available in involuntary
resettlement projects, which are often located in peripheral areas.
-21-
8 local provision shop
Chapter 3. Case Studies in the Philippines
In this chapter, I provide more information on my two case study sites and
describe the problems commonly seen in the urban relocation projects in the
Philippines.
3-1. Case-1: Bautista in Dasmarin-as, Cavite
3-1-1. General Project Outline
NHA has developed its fourth resettlement project since 1974 in Dasmarinas
Bagong Bayan (DBB), Cavite, approximately 32 kilometers south of Manila. The
project site has been expanded, and 148,137 families are now residing from Area
A to Area F that covers 523 hectares of land. Within this huge relocation site,
there is Area D, Bagong Bayan - Bautista, which started receiving relocatees in
late 1994. This 30.7 hectares of land is home to 3,119 urban poor families as of
February 9, 1996. Its occupants came from different places and with different
reasons 9. The relocatees have come from Lawton and Sta. Mesa who were
affected by the Pasig River Rehabilitation Program (PRRP)10, some 650 families
from the Plastic Village near the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA)
area affected by the NAIA expansion and modernization project11, and some
350 families from that infamous Smokey Mountain, which had once
represented urban poverty in the Philippines.
9 In addition to these people who are affected by such projects classified by the NHA as the "national priority
resettlement projects", there are over 800 families who moved in from local squatter areas. NHA does not seem
to have any say in selecting these families under the usual procedures, as the governor of Cavite made the list
and simply give it to the NHA. This is the clear evidence that the NHA is invloved in the game of local politics.
10 1,071 families out of 1,475 families planned have already relocated to Bautista.
11 The relocatees from the Plastic Village (Aeroville Extension, Pasay City) were affected by the NAIA
Terminal 2 Development Project. The main concerned agency is the Manila International Airport Authority that
subcontracted its resettlement program to the NHA with the feel of 53,500 pesos per targeted household.
-22-
Figure 2. Map of the Project Area
Source: NHA and DPWH
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Having relocatees affected by PRRP, a pet project of the First Lady, and from the
President's Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project, it has
been claimed that these groups of relocatees have been given some special
considerations from the implementing agencies. Although the PRRP and
Smokey Mountain have been classified by the NHA as 'national priority
resettlement projects', it is my view that the major problems faced by the
residents are exactly the same as in other relocation sites developed by NHA in
the past 32 years. As the focus of my study is the people who are affected by
urban development projects, I have only conducted interviews with people
relocated as a result of the PRRP and the NAIA project.
3-1-2. Problems - Basic Services, Livelihood
(1) Basic Services: Most of the people affected by PRRP were relocated to the site
between October 1994 and April 1995, while people affected by NAIA came in
August 1994. A large number of the relocatees were relatively fresh arrivals, as
evidenced by the use of simple housing materials, such as plastic and
cardboard. The most immediate problems they have been facing were the lack
of water, electricity and livelihood. There are two elevated water tanks to serve
the needs of the relocatees, but there is no electricity to run the motors that will
pump the water up. The lack of water is further compounded by the required
down payment of 1,000 - 1,500 pesos (US $1=26 pesos) for each household's
connection. The residents are now buying water from an illegal source at 2.5
pesos for every water container. It may take some time before the relocation
area is provided with electricity. One of the requirements of Manila Electric
Company (Meralco) is that 70% of the total number of intended beneficiaries of
the resettlement site must have applied for electricity before it can install the
primary infrastructure. More families need to apply before electricity can be
supplied to the site.
The other common problem that people in the community raised was the loss
of access to other services, such as churches. An NHA official commented that
the construction of a church should be done by relocatees, as there is a open
space provided for community use. Therefore, residents at the Bautista will
have to wait a few more years to have their church constructed on a self-help
basis. At present, they simply do not have either time or money to start
construction. A church or some sort of prayer house is needed not only because
the majority of residents are faithful Christians, but also because they need to
have some place to gather with other residents and to re-establish a
neighborhood network.
(2) Livelihood: The lack of livelihood available at or near the resettlement site
is the most immediate and long-term problem for the majority of relocatees.
Many respondents feel that their living conditions at the relocation site are
better than their conditions prior to relocation because they have a homelot
and live in a safer and cleaner environment. On the other hand, some claim
that their condition at the site is more difficult and/or worse than their
previous condition. Many have said that income in Metro Manila is higher
and complained about the site's distance from their place of work. Prior to
relocation, most of the beneficiaries were transportation workers (pedicab,
tricycle, jeepney, bus and truck drivers) or construction related workers
(carpenters, electricians, mansons, welders, painters, etc). Janitorial and
domestic service occupations, such as helpers, janitors, laundry women, baby
sitters, small-scale vendors, and factory workers, were also common. As these
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jobs are much more easily found in Metro Manila than in the resettlement
sites and in the neighboring vicinity, Metro Manila remains the major source
of employment for most of the relocated families. In particular, most residents
from the NAIA area seem to have kept their previous jobs. These workers are
now spending 1.5 to 4 hours commuting by jeepnies daily. They are burdened
by the high transportation cost which varies from 20 to 50 pesos a day
depending on which part of Metro Manila they work. As commuting is time
and money-consuming, some say that they workers prefer to stay at offices,
construction sites, or relatives' houses in Metro Manila during the weekdays
and come back to the relocation site only during the weekends.
In the past, NHA was trying to set up industrial estates in the resettlement sites.
At DBB, it designed and administered an industrial estate composed of nine
factories for the purpose of providing alternative employment. As of January
1996, there are only two factories still in operation. Some government officials
commented that this is mainly because resettlers tend to create a strong labor
union. Friction between management and workers could not be easily
resolved, and the situation reached the point where factories decided to leave.
These efforts to develop an industrial estate and to absorb the labor force inside
the resettlement areas have failed not only at the DBB but also at the other
resettlement sites, such as Carmona and Sapang Palay. Given these results and
the Presidential Executive Order 90 of 1986, which has limited NHA's direct
provision of livelihood services, the same measures could not be taken at
Bautista. Under these circumstances, NHA has been required to make serious
efforts to coordinate with other agencies in providing alternative options for
employment. As each agency has respective priority projects at hand and
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without additional financial resources available, NHA has always been given
low priority.
However, there are some programs being implemented by other agencies. As
NHA has focused on the promotion of home-base production through skill
development, the Department of Agriculture (DA) has provided skill training
such as agro-processing and toyo12 making, targeting women in particular. The
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) has provided a six-
week high-speed sewing course. After completion of this training, trainers will
be recommended to factories at the Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in the
neighboring vicinities. Residents, however, are generally hesitant to participate
in these training programs. The reasons are: (1) The priority is to earn on a day-
to day basis. They cannot afford to forego current income for training; (2)
Women sometimes could not find someone who could take care of their
children while they are away for training, as a mutual-help network is not yet
established; (3) Many residents are used to working as market vendors, and
they do not find these production-oriented skills to be relevant. As a result, the
impact has been very marginal.
There are signs that some changes might be forthcoming. A new livelihood
and productivity center is to be established by the Helping Foundation, Inc. at
the NHA's property particularly targeting those who affected by PRRP. The
First Lady is a honorary chairperson of this foundation. It is planning to
replicate free livelihood seminars and training programs being undertaken at
its Livelihood and Productivity Center in Vitas, Tondo (Smokey Mountain).
Since July 1995, it has been providing a series of training programs in different
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12soy source
sectors, such as electronics, mechanics, hotel and restaurant management,
computers, and machine operation. However, these courses will be tailored for
the conditions at the Bautista. Considering that there are many foreign and
local factories in neighboring vicinities in Cavite, NHA is now assisting the
foundation to conceptualize course designs based on local industries' demand.
NHA officials are well aware that there is a strong criticism of such skill
training. One common criticism is that the machinery being used at these
training centers tends to be very obsolete and that such training does not
provide high-level skills needed at mainly export-oriented factories. Until now,
NHA was trying desperately to secure cooperation not only from local
governments, but also from private firms in order to generate livelihood
opportunities for the resettlers. With a strong political support coming from
the First Lady and additional funding from the Presidential Social Fund, these
unwilling partners of NHA have finally been put into the position in which
they could not ignore requests to cooperate any longer. For instance, some
private companies appear likely to commit to provide machinery needed at the
center or to employ people who have completed the training. In the long run,
the foundation is hoping to get subcontracting jobs from these factories at the
center. The magnitude and impact of such programs on resettlers economic
well-being are still uncertain, as they only started operation in July 1995 at
Tondo and in February 1996 at the Bautista. It is clear, however, that the
foundation's political and financial power surely has made a difference. NHA
is able to make inter-agency coordination more feasible through its newly
acquired authority as a secretariat of this program.
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(3) Housing: At the Bautista, beneficiaries are provided with 50 sq. m. homelot.
NHA believes that houses should be improved in accordance with the family's
economic capacity and the importance of housing in the overall family's
hierarchy of values. This is also believed to increase affordability of a project
among beneficiaries compared with other costly schemes that provide a
housing unit and a home lot. The other practical reason why the NHA has
moved to this strategy of a simple provision of a homelot is that it can reduce
the heavy burden of initial development costs. Furthermore, recurrent
operational cost is minimized as it does not have to develop sites and provide a
house with a lot.
When I visited the Bautista, I observed all different sizes of housing structures
that used different materials from salvaged materials to concrete. The majority
of the houses are one or two room shacks, averaging 20 sq. m. Given the
worsening incomes, housing improvement is apparently not the first priority
of residents. The nature of relocation and the assistance by agencies are not
significantly related to the type of dwelling units built by the relocatees.
Although I presumed that the availability of financial assistance in housing
materials could directly influence the types of housing units, it was apparently
not the case at the Bautista. (However, this does not apply to the people from
the Smokey Mountain, who are receiving 7,000 pesos worth of housing
materials from the NHA as part of their compensation package and are not
allowed to use the materials they have brought from the previous residence.)
For those affected by the PRRP, loans for the purchase of housing construction
materials up to 5,000 pesos, were made available to interested families. This
loan fund is provided by the Pag-ibig Fund and managed by the General
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Mariano Alvarez Credit Cooperative (GMACCO)13. About 450 families out of
715 families applied for this loan. The rest of the relocatees seem to be hesitant
to take out loans to improve their dwelling units. The most common reasons
given for this attitude include the lack of sufficient income to repay their loan
and a fear of having loans. They would rather rely on their personal savings or
income to spend on their minimal but adequate housing situation. While
there is no housing material loan available for the residents affected by NAIA,
some residents are using their personal savings or financial assistance from
their relatives. As a result, there were no distinctive differences in the type of
dwelling units built by the relocatees affected by PRRP and those of other
residents.
The price of a Bautista homelot is 15,000 pesos, which is payable over 25 years.
Although the scheme is supposed to apply a full cost recovery, it appears to
ignore basic market considerations, such as inflation and land speculation.
Residents have to pay 50 pesos for monthly amortization over the period of 25
years. At present, collection of monthly amortization at the Bautista reaches as
high as 70~80 percent, while it only amounts to 38 percent in other areas of
DBB. NHA officials and some NGO workers commented, however, that this
high payment rate would soon drop to the level of other resettlement areas in
DBB as other resettlement projects. The tendency is for payment rates to drop
from three years after the actual relocation. This could be attributed to the poor
administrative performance of the government. Although it attempts to
operate on a strict cost recovery basis, lenient methods of collection have
13 GMACCO was founded in GMA in 1972 in order to assist relocatees from the Smokey Mountain. It has
about 487 members at Bautista. It now assumes responsibility to provide provide housing materials to residents
affected by the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project and helps to process housing material
loans for those affected by the PRRP. Those who are interested in taking this loan, which is payable in two
years with an annual interest rate of 9%, have to be a member of Pag-ibig and pay 20 pesos monthly
contribution to Pag-ibig Fund.
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resulted in a situation whereby few residents are actually making monthly
payments at the other resettlement sites. One NHA officer pointed out the
serious shortage of collectors. For example, there are only 5 collectors who are
in charge of 15,000 accounts in the whole DBB. Also, residents tend to be less
motivated to make their payments as there is no penalty enforced upon the
people who have defaulted. Up to the present, NIA administrators have been
reluctant to use eviction as an instrument to force payment, non-payers do not
feel seriously threatened.
3-2. Case-2: Family Village Resources (FVR), Cavite
3-2-1. General Outline of Project
Today, as the nation works towards the vision for the "Philippines 2000"14,
there are many government infrastructure projects planned. However, with
the promulgation of RA 7279, which requires the mandatory provision of
relocation sites for all families that are displaced by government projects, a
great number of DPWH's priority infrastructure projects in areas of the
National Capital Region (NCR) cannot be made unless and until the
mandatory resettlement sites are available. This, in effect, made the DPWH
almost totally dependent on the NHA, with which it had contracted its
resettlement programs. However, NHA was not able to address the DPWH
requirements and meet its priorities, so the DPWH started undertaking its own
resettlement activities in March, 1992.
As the DPWH is not mandated to implement a housing resettlement program,
it contacted the executive agency for housing, the Housing Urban Development
1 4 It is a development vision prepared by the present Ramos administration that was launched in January 1993.
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Coordination Council (HUDCC), which administers a National Shelter
Program. The HUDCC brought in the Home Insurance Guarantee Cooperation
(HIGC) as a Trustee for the purpose of acquiring and developing suitable
relocation sites for the families who were going to be displaced by the DPWH's
construction projects. HIGC chose a 10-hectare property for development of the
DPWH's first such relocation site15. The site was called the Family Village
Resources (FVR) at Barangay Kabilang Baybay in the Town of General Mariano
Alvarez (GMA), Province of Cavite. The initial target was to construct 1,800
units of 20 sq. m. row houses on a 32 sq. m. lot. The price of the house and lot
was P80,000 per unit, or a total cost of P144 million. As of January 1996, 1,735
houses have been constructed.
Just as in the previous case of the NHA, this site accommodates groups of
people relocated as a result of different projects. Initially, this site was
developed for the people affected by the Metro Manila Flood Control Project
who have been relocated to this site since February 1993. The project aims at
controlling the floods which cover 7% of the Metro Manila's land area
annually. This problem is compounded by a lack of proper drainage systems
and rapid urbanization, which increases storm-water run-off while reducing
the capacity of storm channels through siltation and garbage dumping (USAID,
1992). The Flood Control Project is funded by the Japanese OECF, and its
resulting resettlement project was also partially financed by OECF. There are
currently also about 100 families who were affected by the Circumferential
Road 5 (C-5) construction project and some 50 families affected by the PRRP.
1 5 Currently, there are two other sites developed; FVR, Bulacan and Taguig.
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Having visited the Bautista property, where I could see different sizes of
housing structures using all kinds of construction materials from scraps to
concrete, it was a pleasant surprise to see how well planned and developed the
FVR site was. Roads are well-paved with asphalt and row houses are
constructed in an orderly way. Some of the earliest arrivals have already started
developing their front-yards. However, despite the first impression, this site is
facing problems similar to those at the Bautista, if not worse.
3-2-2. Problems - Basic Services, Livelihood, and Housing
(1) Basic Services: The most immediate problems residents of FVR have been
facing are the lack of water and livelihood. Water is running only to a limited
number of households, and the amount is too little to serve the needs of all the
residents. As the men are leaving the site early in the morning and coming
home late in the evening, it is left to the women or children to fetch water
from an elevated tank. The Home Owners Association (HOA), which was
established in the relocatees' community by DPWH, is supposed to assume the
responsibility for maintaining water sources and collecting user charges. At the
time of my research, some residents strongly questioned the managerial
capacity of HOA and its chairman. Thus, user charges collection has not yet
been undertaken. Some people have taken advantage of that situation and sell
4 - 10 water containers for 2 - 3 pesos each to households who are located away
from the elevated tank. This cost is not at all negligible considering the low
income level of residents.
(2) Livelihood: A lack of livelihood available at or near the resettlement site is
the most immediate and long-term problem for the majority of relocatees.
After spending almost three years at the relocation site, many respondents feel
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that there have not been any significant improvements in their living
conditions as compared to their previous condition. Like the Bautista case, they
have commented that income in Metro Manila is better, and that commuting
to the work place is a problem. Most of the beneficiaries are transportation
workers, construction related workers, factory workers, and those in the
janitorial and domestic service occupations such as helpers, janitors, laundry
women, baby sitters, and small-scale vendors. Metro Manila still remains the
major source of employment for most of these relocated families because of the
greater availability of jobs in the city.
Most of the bread-winners are now spending 1.5 to 4 hours a day commuting by
jeepnies to work. They are burdened by the high transportation costs that range
from 40 to 60 pesos a day. In addition, as the location of FVR is away from the
main street where the market is and where jeepnies to Metro Manila operates
from. Many people have to take tricycle for 12 to 20 pesos per trip to and from
by the main street. As they usually share this cost among three to four people,
the individual cost is about three to five pesos. Because commuting is time and
money-consuming, there are people who are renting a house at the FVR but
staying in Metro Manila. The problem of commuting and the high
transportation costs are not limited to adults. Some parents at FVR have
stopped sending children to school as it costs about 20 pesos a week to commute
to the nearest public primary school, which is located across the valley.
Although the school building located on site has been completed, it is not ready
to open due to the lack of coordination with the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS).
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The DPWH is not equipped to provide livelihood projects by itself and is not
allowed to make a direct contract with organizations specialized in this field.
Therefore, it has included these projects in a contract with a site developer.
DPWH is allowed make contracts only with construction companies, which are
not in a position to assume the responsibility for implementing income
generation programs. Initially, the FVR developer sponsored training for
cooperative development and livelihood projects. It provided a contribution of
141,000 pesos as seed capital for livelihood projects. Residents at FVR used the
funds to establish a multi-purpose cooperative that failed miserably primarily
due to a shortage of operating funds and management problems. The FVR
developer then contracted a local NGO to provide a series of livelihood
training projects, such as soap making, patis (fish sauce) production, soy sauce
production, candle making, etc. None of these training programs were
operationalized. At present, there is no income generating project being
undertaken except for those residents affected by PRRP. For this special group,
the Clean and Green Foundation led by the First Lady, has sent two volunteer
workers to implement a rug making project and has provided five sewing
machines. As the project is till in its infancy, it is too early to judge how
effective this program will be in improving the economic well-being of these
beneficiaries. In any case, it is a very limited effort.
(3) Housing: According to DPWH, the two main problems they have
encountered in the FVR project are a high abandonment rate and the refusal to
pay monthly amortization and sale costs by some of the families in the
program. Even the officers of the DPWH have admitted that about 50% of
original beneficiaries have left the site and have most likely gone back to Metro
Manila. As the NGO representatives pointed out, the relocated people will not
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stay in the site without employment. Thus, resettlement remains a vicious
cycle, with families returning to the city or broken up by the need of
breadwinners to live where they can get jobs.
The price of an FVR unit (house and a lot) is 80,000 pesos which is payable over
25 years with an annual interest rate of 9%. As of January 1996, no one had paid
the monthly amortization yet. At the time of my research, officers of the
DPWH were trying to assemble the documents necessary to have all residents
apply for the existing secondary mortgage programs brought together under the
Unified Home Lending Program (ULP) and to collect amortization accordingly.
For instance, residents who are not members of the Social Security System
(SSS)16, the Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-ibig Fund) or Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) 1 7, which are funding sources of the ULP and
managed by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corp.(NHMFC), have to pay
671.36 pesos. Since most of the residents are non-formal sector income earners
and are not eligible to apply for SSS and GSIS, the DPWH has encouraged them
to apply for mortgage loan and amortization support under Abot-Kaya Pabahay
Fund 18 at the NHMFC. This support is provided to; (1) those with a monthly
gross family income of not more than 4,000 pesos and granted loan not
exceeding 80,000 pesos; or (2) those with a monthly gross family income of not
more than 5,000 pesos and granted loans of more than 80,000 pesos, but not
exceeding 100,000 pesos. The support is only applicable during the first five
years of their loans. Almost 80% of the FVR residents are categorized as (1), and
their monthly amortization is as follows:
1 6 Primary provider of funds for home mortgages of private sector employees.
1 7 Primary provider of funds for home mortgages of government sector employees.
18This is otherwise known as the Socail Housing Support Fund Act (Republic Act 6846).
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Table 1. Monthly Amortization
Amortization Period Amortization Support Net Monthly Amortization
1st year 35% 436.38 pesos
2nd year 30% 469.95 pesos
3rd year 25% .503.52 pesos
4th year 20% 577.37 pesos
5th-25th year 14% 671.36 pesos
Source: Documents provided by DPWH
For the DPWH, linking up with the ULP has two positive aspects. Firstly, as the
DPWH is not equipped to deal with the collection of monthly amortization,
efficiency is improved if these related housing organizations do the collections.
Secondly, holding these housing mortgage organizations and their collectors
accountable is desirable from DPWH's point of view. These secondary
mortgage agencies have a stronger presence as an accountable agency for
financial matters than the DPWH in the minds of the residents. Therefore, this
system is quite convenient for the DPWH as it lessens potential friction with
communities.
However, even with this collection system being put into place, the questions
of willingness to pay and affordability remain. Why did the DPWH have to
wait this long to start collecting documents necessary for amortization
collection in the first place? Even the NHA, well known for being bureaucratic
and inefficient, usually starts collecting monthly amortization six months after
the relocation based on documentation gathered prior to the relocation. There
are three main reasons for the DPWH delay: Firstly, DPWH always has a tight
deadline to meet and could not spare enough time to collect the documents
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necessary for payments and for mortgage program applications. The officers of
the DPWH said that it was extremely difficult to collect these documents before
the relocation because of the hostility among the residents being relocated. This
indicates that there was a serious lack of effort by the DPWH side to develop a
consensus on the terms of payment among the affected community. As any
delay in the implementation of a project plan would be costly, the DPWH chose
not to wait for community consensus before starting to displace people out of
the path of the possible projects, such as flood control or highways
development.
Secondly, there is a serious problem with the management of relocation
projects that stems from the DPWH's organizational structure. It is clear that
there is an engineering and technical bias in the DPWH, and this has limited
the range of variables taken into consideration in the project planning process.
The DPWH's Action Office on Squatter Relocation has about 50 officers.
Almost all the officers who are working on displacement and demolition of
squatters are engineers. Only seven officers, including one clerk are directly
engaged in resettlement, three of whom are working for the FVR. These six
officers have degrees in liberal arts or the social sciences, but have no previous
experience in dealing with the socio-cultural aspects of resettlement, let alone
community organization.
Thirdly, there is simply no willingness to pay on the part of residents. Unlike
the Bautista case, I did not feel that residents are feeling obliged to pay or that
they are fully aware of their responsibilities to pay. Some have complained that
they never thought that they had to pay, at least such a large amount. Also, a
number of residents have complained about the poor quality of housing
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construction. For what they are expected to pay, they believe that they are
entitled to better quality housing. Again, there seems to be a widespread notion
that whatever the government does should be for free. This perception gap
could be bridged by the careful dissemination of information or by providing
consultations prior to relocations.
The biggest issue regarding housing payments is affordability. The level of
monthly amortization is simply too high considering the income of the project
beneficiaries. Assuming the commonly-used rate of 20% out of total income
which households on average spend for shelter needs, the current minimum
wage rate of 165 pesos a day yields 900 pesos per month available for housing
expense. However, there is a reason to doubt that the average poor family can
pay 20 per cent of family income for housing. Studies done along the Pasig
River by the sociology team of the PRRP show that rents for 16 sq. m. rooms
range from 300 - 500 pesos. These rentals probably reflect what the urban poor
could afford for urban housing.
Based on the past studies on poverty, food is the single biggest expenditure
among the poor households, taking 63 to 76% of total income. Shelter (rent,
water and electricity) is the second largest expenditure, followed by education,
transportation, medical care, clothing, business investments and recreation
(Jumenez, et.al 1986). Most of the residents at FVR are spending one-quarter of
their income for transportation. If this 25% is added to food, then these two
items alone account for 88% or even go beyond the total household
expenditure. That would not leave enough resources for all other expenses,
including shelter. According to the Institute of Social Work and Community
Development of the University of the Philippines, urban poor families devote
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only three percent of their family budget to housing (Rebullida, 1993). Based on
a government's poverty threshold income set now in Metro Manila at 5,656
pesos19, that would amount to 169 pesos a month.
Although there is no way to determine the income levels of residents at FVR
from official statistics, an estimate of 4,000 pesos a month or a little less might
be a reasonable figure, as this is used as a base figure to apply for amortization
support through the Abot-kaya Pabahay Fund. This means that only a very
limited number of people could meet the required monthly amortization
payment. The residents who were relocated due to C-5 construction seem to be
relatively well-off and most likely to be able to make this monthly payment, as
many of them are permanent workers, such as government officials. On the
other hand, it is likely that the majority of the residents will default sooner or
later. The DPWH is currently planning to evict those who default so that they
could 'motivate' other people to pay. This would also make some houses
available for new relocatees, an easier and less expensive option for the DPWH
than the development of other sites. This option could be politically costly for
the DPWH if there is a disagreement from donor agencies such as OECF.
However, the DPWH seems more willing to put this option into practice than
the NHA. As a result, residents continue to be kept under the threat of eviction
as they had experienced previously in the urban slums.
19 This is a monthly poverty threshold for a family of six. National Economic and Development Authority.
November 21, 1995. "Preliminary 1994 Poverty Estimates.". Philippines.
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3-3. General Lessons
3-3-1. Economic Repercussions
From the above cases, I have raised serious questions about whether these
resettlement projects serve to restore the social and economic well-being of the
displaced population. The importance of economic rehabilitation by ensuring
an alternate means of livelihood for the people displaced has been given
inadequate attention in both case studies. The economic repercussions of
relocation seem to fall into three categories: (1)those relating to time and
expense of travel to work; (2) those relating to the changes in the availability of
jobs, especially for women; and (3) those relating to the need to make monthly
mortgage payments for the housing.
It is clear that the time and cost it takes the relocatees to travel to work has
increased significantly and causes severe hardship. Low income people, who
can ill afford the cost of transportation, generally choose to locate close to their
labor market and near the city center. Relocation areas, however, tend to be
located on the outskirts of the city where land is still relatively cheap.
Therefore, the first effect of relocation is a long and expensive journey to work.
I have found that people traveling to the center of Metro Manila would have to
travel about two to four hours each day and spend about one-fourth of their
daily wage on fares. Considering the worsening traffic congestion in Metro
Manila, two to three hours of commuting may not sound unusual. It is,
however, imperative to consider the opportunity cost to the poor of long
commutes. Some men complained that because of the serious congestion along
the highways towards Metro Manila, they have lost their jobs because of being
continuously late for work.
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Apart from cost in time and money, there is a serious issue of being isolated
from the job market. The relocation breaks up information networks which the
squatters were able to establish in their former urban neighborhood, and
everything is now left to individual initiative. The immediate loss of
employment is quite acute, especially among women who have depended on
service jobs for the upper classes, such as laundry, sewing, cleaning, etc. They
have also lost social networks to look after their children and could not afford
to commute long-distances due to physical and financial constraints. With
some exceptional cases, most of the male relocatees have retained their former
jobs in Metro Manila. There is a strong tendency to continue working at the
same job and to tolerate the long daily commute. This reflects the lack of jobs
available to them around the relocation sites and the strong demand for low-
skilled workers in Metro Manila. Access to new employment in the
neighboring areas is quite uncertain for both men and women. Despite the fact
that the neighboring area is one of the fastest growing industrial estates in the
country, the educational qualifications, skills, and age of workers required at
foreign financed factories with a strong orientation towards exports, and even
at local industries, do not match those of relocatees.
3-3-2. Morbidity and Food Insecurity
Unemployment and irregular incomes have serious repercussions on the
nutritional condition of the relocatees. Particularly during the rainy season
when many household-heads are jobless or earn only a minimal income, their
families sometimes can not afford to eat three meals a day. Although the urban
poor also suffer most during this time of the year, they have greater flexibility
than the relocated families to overcome the crisis. They can find a new job
much faster, and there are cheap sources of food and fuel supplies, such as
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markets, small vendors in and around the slums, and fair price shops. Those
who are working also depend on cheap restaurants and roadside vendors of
cooked food. However, the price of rice and other basic foodstuffs in
resettlement areas is approximately 10-15% higher than in Metro Manila. The
market stall holders have to buy their goods in Metro Manila and, therefore,
add the transportation costs to the price. In a situation of decreased incomes
coupled with higher costs of living, particularly for food, the relocated families
cannot afford to purchase as much food as they could in Metro Manila prior to
the relocation.
3-3-3. Social Disarticulation
It seems that the implementing agencies are assuming that different
communities would live happily together, share amenities, and become
integrated during the process of relocation. The selection of a single large site
seen as convenient and efficient only from the point of view of the
implementing agency. However, bringing people from different slums onto a
single relocation area may well lead to tensions between communities. It takes
quite some time to reestablish dismantled social support networks, such as
mutual-help arrangements, labor exchange relationships, child-care reciprocity,
and food borrowing, that are vital assets and life support mechanisms for many
families (Cernea 1990). Apart from existing community organizations brought
from the original slums people were relocated from, a community
organization in a relocation site should be formed to cover the whole area. Its
purpose would be to deal with any inter-community difficulties and the
problems of planning, maintenance and operation that will inevitably occur.
However, this has been difficult in the study area due to the lack of NGOs, civil
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organizations, and church organizations that typically initiate such
movements.
Social disarticulation can be seen not only in a community, but also in
households. I found that there are a quite a number of people who find the
cost and time of the daily commute so burdensome that they arrange for a place
to stay in the city, returning to the relocation sites only on weekends. There
were some incidents of family breakups reported to me during the time of my
research. A few men stopped coming home as they had started new families
with other women in the city.
3-3-4. Housing Conditions
The government has attempted to convince the squatters of the many
advantages that relocation could offer them. They are told that it would put an
end to their illegal existence in filthy, over-crowded urban quarters and provide
them with a clean and healthy environment. But for most of the relocated
families the reality looks completely different. Relocation means a
multiplication of costs in almost all aspects of life. Besides the indirect costs of
water and electricity charges, and commuting costs, people need to make a
monthly mortgage payments for their housing. They must pay for the lot
allocated to them despite the deep socio-economic setbacks caused by their
relocation. In actuality, the relocated families still have the status of squatters,
living on land that does not belong to them and from which they could be
evicted at any time. I met a quite number of relocatees who mistake occupancy
for a de facto ownership that the law does not recognize.
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The residents do have the opportunity to own the land legitimately, but the
land titles will be allocated to the relocatees only upon the receipt of payment
equal to the value of the lot. At the Bautista, the cost is 15,000 pesos for a 50 sq.
m homelot, and 80,000 pesos for a house and a lot at the FVR. This is payable
within a period of 25 years. Although there is no way to determine income
levels of squatter dwellers from official statistics, an estimate of 3,000-4,000
pesos a month or a little less might be a reasonable figure according to the
DPWH and the survey done in 1992 by the Urban Poor Associates, a local NGO.
(This figure is much less than government's poverty line, set now in Metro
Manila at 5,656 pesos.) There is a strong criticism among relocatees that the
price of land is too high given their income level. Many people, particularly at
the FVR, showed strong resentment over the payments. Not only do they find
the price high, but they feel the payment has been forced upon them. The
residents feel no particular obligation to pay, as they feel that the land they
occupy is theirs by right.
The literature on housing points out that houses can be improved in
proportion to the family's economic capacity, the level of perceived security of
tenure and the importance of housing in the overall family hierarchy of
values. Given the worsening income situation, housing improvement is
apparently not given the first priority. The only thing preventing further
deterioration of housing conditions is the administrative inefficiency of the
implementing agencies. In the case of DPWH, nobody has not yet paid monthly
amortization since the FVR first received relocatees in February 1993. In the
case of the NHA, although it attempts to operate on a strict cost recovery basis,
lenient methods of collection are expected to result in a quite a high default
rate, e.g. 50-70% in a few years time.
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A major concern now is the impact on residents if NHA or the DPWH starts
enforcing collections. Many residents are not able to afford both land payments
and house improvement costs. If collections become enforced under threat of
eviction, house building activity may well come to a halt. Up to the present,
NHA administrators have been reluctant to use eviction as an instrument to
force payment, and non-payers are not yet been seriously threatened. Residents
seem to be aware that were eviction tactics evoked, the financial gains to these
agencies might be more than offset by the political embarrassment of evicting
poor relocatees from a project to which the same authorities had sent them.
This creates rather favorable conditions to the relocatees, as they presume that
they will be able to stay and feel secure, even without actually possessing a land
title.
3-3-5. Management Issues
NHA's budget and resettlement land supply are being exhausted due to the
depletion of the capital base as a result of the failure to collect amortization
payments of relocatees, and the bureaucratic inefficiency. Agencies such as the
DPWH, which formerly contracted with the NHA in its resettlement program,
have moved into the resettlement business for themselves. The NHA now has
an extremely tight budget and a diminished mandate vis-a-vis squatter
relocation. The NHA is forced to sit on the sidelines and watch this mere
rookie in the game of squatter relocation undertake projects that disregard the
experience that NHA has accumulated in this area. Even though it can be
agreed that the efforts of NHA in squatter resettlement have been
undistinguished, the fact remains that the NHA has considerable experience in
this activity.
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A major difficulty caused by the diminution of NHA's role is that relocation
compensation packages will vary even more wildly than they have in the past.
The FVR project of DPWH does not reflect the more standard packages offered
by NHA. The FVR project offers houses and lots at a high rate of amortization
of 617 pesos. NIA's amortization program, though a dismal failure, generally
sets repayment levels of between 30 pesos and 100 pesos. NHA's lot sizes,
ranging from 50 to 150 sq. m. (50 sq. m. at the Bautista, where the beneficiaries
pay 50 pesos a month under the Presidential Decree 2015), are usually much
bigger than those provided by other agencies like the DPWH. At the FVR,
DPWH offers 32 sq. m. lots and row house unit of 28 sq. m. This ad-hoc and
differential treatment by the government agencies generates much
dissatisfaction among the affected communities.
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Chapter 4. Conclusions and Recommendations
4-1. Summary of Evaluations of the Relocation Projects
While the predominant effects of urban renewal are indisputably positive for
many urban inhabitants, the compulsory relocation that it generates in parallel
can have serious adverse effects. The loss of dwelling and assets, and the
uprooting from an existing pattern of livelihood carry high impoverishment
risks for those affected directly. Much suffering is caused because most of the
relocations reviewed involved displacement over large distances. The loss of
jobs were not compensated by alternative sources of income in or near the
relocation site.
In addition to the tangible economic losses, there are social and cultural
disruptions in neighborhood ties and kinship networks. These non-
quantifiable social and economic costs include the loss of access to mutual help,
child care arrangements, exchange and borrowing opportunities, and other
informal support mechanisms. As the communities relocated tend to be from
the lower income segments of the society, the social and economic costs of
relocation are also most severely felt by these communities. Furthermore, it is
likely that they will be further impoverished in the relocation process.
Both case studies in the previous chapter indicate that residents have not yet
recovered the standard of living that they enjoyed prior to relocation.
Although this "transitional stage" is generally assumed to last only up to 2~3
years after relocation (Scudder and Colson, 1982), residents at the FVR are still
at this stage almost three years after the relocation. The major reason is that
compensation mechanisms, particularly livelihood programs, have been
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dismal. The outcome is not surprising in view of the fact that the projects were
implemented from the perspective of the implementing authorities own
priorities and not based on the real needs of the affected communities. The
participation of the relocatees in the planning and implementation was very
limited or non-existent.
4-2. Recommendations for the Filipino Government Agencies
The two case projects examined reveal wide differences in the quality and
effectiveness of the approaches to displacement and relocation as used by the
two implementing government agencies. Many fundamental life and welfare
issues facing the relocatees continue to be disregarded or are resolved
inequitably. Based on the results of my project analysis, I would recommend
the following to the Filipino government agencies for the purpose of
improving their performance in future resettlement programs.
(1) Relocation to In-city Sites or Where Employment Opportunities Exist is
Preferable.: Considering the skyrocketing land prices in Metro Manila, inner-
city relocation may not be a feasible option, especially for implementing
agencies that are facing a serious lack of financial resources to develop
resettlement sites. However, it should be considered as one option whenever
possible. One way to put this option into practice is to construct medium-rise
buildings (MRBs) that NHA has introduced since 1990 at inner-city relocation
sites. MRBs maximize the use of the land by increasing the density. As high
construction costs of MRBs is the main concern at present, comprehensive
study on methods of possible low cost construction should be further looked
into to avoid affordability issues.
-49-
Furthermore, there is a clear tendency for agencies to establish resettlement
sites that are isolated from neighboring communities. If resettlement sites
could be established close to middle and high income communities, it would
allow many relocatees to find some service-oriented jobs. Location of sites
should also be chosen in accordance with the availability of employment
opportunities.
(2) Employment Generation by Linking Industrial Development to Relocation
Programs: For the purpose of providing employment near the resettlement
sites, effective coordination with agencies, such as the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), and the Board of Investment (BOI) of the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI), is most imperative. For instance, Cavite along with
other CALABARZON provinces, is considered as a catch basin for overflows in
Metro Manila's industrial manufacturing sector. This is a region where the
government and private investors are pouring much of their resources.
Establishment of industrial estates (IE) and export processing zones (EPZ) has
been accelerated, and the demand for wage labor is strong, but for particular
type of industries. These estates usually require higher-level skills attuned to
higher states of technology. A strategy based on strong demand for skilled labor
would increase employability of trainees, especially if skill upgrading training
programs are customized according to the needs of large corporations and
industrial estates. In order to have closer linkages with the industries,
coordination between DTI or DOLE and the relocation implementing agencies
should be encouraged.
(3) Incorporation of NGOs/POs: Having witnessed the successive failures of the
government relocation projects, some NGOs and church-based organizations
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have been actively involved in getting the relocatees organized so that their
needs can be better heard. These organizations also served to defend the rights
of relocatees before and during the relocation processes. They have also
provided significant help to the people displaced by addressing the complex
social and cultural problems of people's involuntary resettlement (Cernea,
1988). NGO intervention is still needed by relocatees for the provision of
services at the relocation sites, particularly during the critical adjustment
period.
The ability of both NHA and DPWH to provide significant livelihood
assistance is unfortunately limited. Together with the disruptive effects of
relocation on livelihood, the need for a more concerted approach by NGOs
becomes evident. I was disappointed to find that there are not many NGOs
working actively at relocation sites. Most of the NGOs that assist residents at
FVR and Bautista are training and advocacy oriented NGOs based in Manila.
They assisted in setting up people's organizations (POs) in the communities
prior to the relocation, but most of these POs are not well developed or
equipped to have access to assistance from outside organizations, to provide
services, or to implement income generating projects. Most of the NGOs have
physical constraints. As they are usually located in Metro Manila, they cannot
effectively provide assistance to distant relocation sites. At the same time,
many of them do not have any experience or capacity to provide services that
relocatees actually need after being relocated.
Active involvement of NGOs and church organizations in the planning period
prior to relocation is invaluable, but it is more imperative at the relocation
sites. It will be important for implementing agencies to make a list of NGOs
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that have enough capacity to assist relocatees at resettlement sites especially
during their adjustment period. These agencies should then organize a steering
committee with some listed NGOs that will carry out a needs assessment of
relocatees, and help to plan, implement, and monitor programs to improve
their livelihood. Focus should be put on providing additional income earning
opportunities through providing development financing packages, market
promotions, and cooperative formation strategies.
(4) Active Involvement of Local Governments: NIA continue to hold the title
to the resettlement sites that it administers. This constraints the range of
services that could be provided by local governments. The significant number
of relocatees represents a substantial block of voting power, particularly for
local politicians. Unfortunately, these politicians have no incentive to work for
relocatees as long as the relocation sites exist as 'colonies' of federal
government agencies. Consultations currently undertaken between
NHA/DPWH and local governments appear to be little more a way of
preventing opposition from local leaders. If people can organize themselves
into a municipality, the local government would have to assume responsible
for improving social services. It is thus recommended to (1) assist the relocated
community to organize into a barangay! municipality; (2) transfer some
administrative authority to local governments; and (3) create genuine
coordination with local governments to implement basic services, such as
water supply, electrification, transportation and livelihood assistance.
(5) Provide Housing Options to Relocatees: The DPWH is currently providing
beneficiaries with a homelot and a housing unit (row house) as they do not
wish to have shanty towns at their resettlement sites. The appearance of
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uniformed rows of houses is impressive to visitors, especially politicians,
donors, and government bureaucrats. In other words, it is 'conveniently'
tangible to those who have vested interests. However, what are the reaction of
residents who are actually living at the resettlement sites? The main
complaints I came across related to the high monthly amortization resulting
from high development costs, and the poor quality of housing. There was a
relatively low level of satisfaction with the housing units among the residents
at the FVR as compared with the residents at the Bautista for these reasons.
Although it seems that the DPWH have no desire to reorient their strategy of
providing both a homelot and a housing unit towards the simple provision of
a home-lot, it is worthwhile to take a close look at the NHA's experience. NHA
switched towards a "home-lot provision" approach after first implementing
the DPWH strategy. The major reason behind the change is that it could reduce
not only the heavy burden of initial development costs, but also the recurrent
operational costs, because it does not have both to develop sites and to provide
a core house with a serviced lot. This substantial cost reduction contributes to
the increased affordability of the housing to beneficiaries. Residents at the
Bautista seem to appreciate this freedom of choice in building their houses in
accordance with their degree of affordability. Self-build houses are usually
preferred by relocatees over government-build housing. Thus, I strongly
recommend that the DPWH look into the NHA's past experience and try to
provide housing options to its beneficiaries. Depending on their preferences
and income levels, it is likely that there are different perceptions among the
communities with regard to housing options.
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In all cases, it is critical to keep obligatory payment to a minimum and to relate
them to the payment capacities of the relocatees. Thorough research prior to
relocation is needed to ensure that this is based on a realistic understanding of
income, given that income-earning opportunities are likely to be less in the
relocation sites.
(6) Retaining Access to Cultural Property: Retaining access to cultural property
such as churches, often by physical relocation, can increase the acceptability of a
resettlement plan and moderate the social disarticulation caused by relocation.
(7) Standardize Relocation Programs: Given the present situation in which
multiple agencies are responsible for urban development and population
relocation, it may be too idealistic to recommend the establishment of a
overriding agency that would be in charge of resettlement programs. It would
be desirable, however, to give overall responsibility to a strengthened national
agency which can focus on the formulation of a national urban resettlement
policy and strategy. This national agency would coordinate and prioritize
programs and policy instruments related to the development of urban areas
and their economies. If this recommendation is not a viable one, efforts should
be made to formulate a national urban resettlement policy and strategy and to
standardize relocation programs, so that beneficiaries of different government
resettlement programs would not feel that they are treated differentially.
(8) Allocation of Sufficient Financial Resources: Currently, the DPWH does not
have any budget set aside for the relocation of affected communities. This has
two implications: First, the quality of relocation programs depends totally on
how the project managers perceive relocation and the volume of funds for
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relocation they can get from the total project budget. Funds are often a small
percentage of the total costs of large projects that necessitate relocation. This
could lead to the ad-hoc treatment of resettlement programs. The tighter the
budget, the more serious the situation. Limited funding for a resettlement
program is particularly a problem with locally funded projects. Second, the
development of resettlement sites can only be undertaken when funds are
actually made available. Disbursement delays can lead to a serious delays both
in implementation of development projects that entail relocation and in the
planning of resettlement programs.
The conclusion is that there should be sufficient financial resources set aside
specifically for the purpose of relocation. In order to insure that this will be the
case, one of the following measures should be undertaken; (a) Full relocation
costs should be incorporated in the financial and economic feasibility studies of
the whole redevelopment that is planned. This should include land costs, costs
of shelter, infrastructure, socio-economic support packages and financial
assistance; (b) A pool of funds should be established at each of the national
agencies involved in development of public projects which are to be used only
for the relocation of affected communities.
(9) Documentation of Project Experiences: In the areas of my research, I was
disappointed with the quality of documented materials on the projects. There
are few comprehensive documents that detail the context of the relocation, the
process itself, its management, and the follow-up activities taken over a
number of years. Although the NHA has been involved in resettlement
projects over the past 32 years, there was no effort to document project
experiences. This reflects poor systematic monitoring and evaluation of
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relocation programs that have taken place. An explanation given was that
there were no human and financial resources available for documentation.
Nevertheless, documentation of project experiences would be invaluable for
the NHA and also for other agencies that are undertaking resettlement
programs. At the same time, other agencies including the DPWH should also
make efforts to document their resettlement operations. This would serve to
improve their understanding of the environment of relocation, the relocation
process, the costs and benefits of different approaches to relocation, and also
their ability to draw conclusions that can guide the development and execution
of future relocation programs and projects. Such efforts will have practical use
only if the practice is institutionalized and there is enough flexibility in
planning and implementation to incorporate and modify existing programs
based on documented experiences.
(10) Increase Social Acceptability of Resettlement Programs: Most of the
relocatees and NGOs that I interviewed did not strongly dispute the necessity of
urban development programs that entail their displacement and relocation.
Some were not even opposed to the idea of displacement and resettlement.
However, they are greatly disappointed with the unnecessary suffering that has
occurred as a result of the relocation. It is clear that any attempt to remove
people from their existing physical, social and economic environment will
have far-reaching implications. The negative effects of relocation can be
minimized if a number of conditions are fulfilled. These conditions include
the delivery of the basic services and concerns over the affected population.
The relocatees' dream of new life is usually shattered as soon as they step into
resettlement sites where the delivery of basic services is lacking. Their
impression of the first few weeks without any water and electricity lingers in
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their minds for a long time, and makes it more difficult for them to accept and
adopt a new living environment at resettlement sites. It is thus imperative that
implementing agencies assure the delivery of basic services prior to receiving
relocatees.
One of the reasons why relocatees feel disappointed with their new
environment is that they simply did not know what kind of life they could
expect to have at resettlement sites in the urban fringe. I believe that this is a
problem because there is a serious lack of effort by the implementing agencies
to provide appropriate information and to earn the trust of their beneficiaries
through dialogue sessions. The DPWH is now taking some of their target
population to their resettlement sites prior to actual relocation in order to assist
them in visualizing their life at resettlement sites. Such efforts, however small
they appear to be, can help relocatees to adapt quickly to their new
environment faster.
(11) Reconsider Current Urban Development Strategies: One should ask why
relocation of low-income household is always perceived as favorable political
choice. Despite the fact that urban slum dwellers in Metro Manila occupy only
5% of the total land area of the metropolis, it seems the majority of target
populations of virtually all relocation programs are the urban poor
households. The overt justification for such relocation programs must be
politically acceptable. Some programs are often rationalized on social policy
grounds, even when they are just a veiled approach to free valuable real estate
for other higher paying users. Infrastructure developments currently
undertaken in Metro Manila serve not the urban poor but economic elite,
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especially in the fields of real estate and industry, who seek to expand their
facilities through massive and expensive infrastructure.
While I acknowledge the fact that there is an urgent need to improve physical
infrastructure for economic development, relocation should be planned in
such a manner to reconcile the need of the society to improve its physical
infrastructure with the protection of the rights and interests of the people most
immediately affected. Urban planning seems to be still the exception rather
than the rule in the Philippines. This should change, and it is imperative that
planning should be done in such a manner that the urban poor could also
share the benefits of the new development. The most feasible alternative to
relocation lies in creating a steady supply and development of land and
housing as well as large scale upgrading/ renewal programs. These programs, if
undertaken on a reasonable scale, could create a natural process of housing
mobility which is consistent with personal or community priorities and in
which resettlement ceases to be necessary, at least to such a significant degree.
4-3. Research Questions
This paper has attempted to explore the impact of resettlement on beneficiaries
and how to mitigate negative impacts. More research is needed to shed light on
the ways relocation project planning impacts on the well-being of beneficiaries.
Future research questions on this topic might include the following:
(1) What political dynamics will be generated by having a great number of
relocatees in host communities? How do these affect the relationship
between local government and the relocatees?
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(2) Relocatees are mostly the urban poor who share a common urban culture,
while the most of relocation sites are situated in urban fringe where the
majority of people still engage in agriculture. General perceptions and the
patterns of behavior in such agriculture-oriented communities are often
different from those of relocatees. To what extent does the relocatees' way of
life affect a host community or neighboring community?
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Appendix
Survey Questionaire
Date: Jan. 2 ,1996
Place: DBB / FVR, Cavite
Personal Data of Respondent
Name: Age: Sex:
Relation to the Land Awardee:
I. Physical Profile of the House (BY OBSERVATION 3-11)
1. House size: sq. m
2. Lot size: sq. m
3. House type
a)
4. Number
5. Walling
a)
c)
6. Roofing
a)
c)
7. Flooring
a)
8. Is there
single detached b) duplex c) others, specify
of stories: a) one b) two c) more than two
materials
indigenous (e.g., nipa, coconut palm) b) plywood
concrete d) salvaged materials e) others, specify
materials
indigenous (e.g., nipa, coconut palm) b) galvanized iron
salvaged materials d) others, specify
materials
wood b) cement c) soil d) others, specify
a toilet indoor? a) yes b) none
9. Appliances found in the house
a) electric fan b) radio c) TV
e) stereo f) video cassette player
10. Furniture found in the house
a) sala set b) cabinets c) dining set
11. Is the house supplied with electricity? a) yes
12. If yes, how much do you pay a month?
refrigerator
others, specify_
d) others
b) no
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13. Is the house supplied with water?
14. If yes, how much do you pay a month?
15. If no, where do you get water?
a) deep-well
# of times a day for fetching water
location: Is it far?
Who does the fetching?
b) water seller
How much per tank?
How many tanks do you consume a day?
c) others, specify-_____
II. Profile of the Family
History of Migration:
16. Where were you born? a) Metro Manila b) Province, specify
17. Where were you living before coming to this site? (specific brgy.& city)
18. How many years did you live there?
a) less than one year b) one to two years
c) three to five years d) more than five to ten years
e) more than ten years
19. Why did you leave that place and come here?
a) because of the government relocation program
b) because you can be a house owner and be secured
c) because everyone else in the community decided to come here
d) by force
e) others, specify __-_-_-_-_-_-_ -_
Family Composition
20. How big is your family? (# of children; nuclear/ extended family;
relatives)
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a) yes b) no
21. Enumerate names of income earning family members with
corresponding occupation, income, work status, place of work, mode of
transportation used, time spent and expenses in going to and from place
of work. (*permanent, casual, contractual, self-employed, others)
Occupation
Before After
Place of Work
Before After
Time Spent
Before After
Work Status*
Before After
Mode of
Before
Transportation
After
Expenses
Before After
22. If the employed family member moved, what caused the moving from
previous place of work to the present? (answer as many)
a) better salary b) lower transportation cost
c) better working condition d) shorter time of travel
e) others, specify __________-________
23. If there are employment opportunities in the neighborhood would the
working members of your family choose to work here?
Name
a)yes b) no, because
_________- a)yes b) no, because____
_-_________ a)yes b) no, because_
24. If there has been an increase in transportation costs, how is this
increased financial burden covered?
25. How often does your working family member come home?
a) full time resident b) weekends c) twice a month
d) once a month e) once in two or three months
f) very irregular
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Name
26. What caused his/her less frequent coming home?
a) distance b) cost of transportation c) demand of the job
d) others, specify 
_____
27. Where do they stay when they are not coming home?
a) previous place in Metro Manila
b) previous neighboring area in Metro Manila
c) other areas in Metro Manila
d) others specify,
28. What are the affects on the family of the working members' infrequent
coming home?
a) deteriorating harmony in the family
b) increasing misunderstanding
c) others, specify 
____
III. Life in Dasmariias
29. What are the advantages of living here for your family?
30. What are the disadvantages?
31. Since you first came to live in Damarinas, has your family situation
a) improved b) gotten worse c) no change
32. What are the difficulties you encountered when you first came in?
33. If are made to choose, would you rather:
a) return to the last place you stayed in Manila
b) prefer to stay here
c) others, specify 
____-___
34. If you plan to return, why?
35. Are you planning to move within the next two years?
a) yes (Why?------------------------------------)
b) no (W hy not?__________ _ _ _____ _ _____________-)
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- 36. Are you satisfied with your house?
a) y es (W hy ? ____________________________________ )
b) no (W hy not?__________________________________)
37. Are you satisfied with your neighborhood?
a) yes (Why? ----------------------------------__)
b) no (Why not?_)
38. Were there people you can turn to in case of emergencies or when you
have problems in your former neighborhood?
a) yes (Who, specify-----------------------------)*
b) none
*NHA/DPWH, barangay captain, neighbors, relatives, NGO/PO,
cooperatives
39. How about in your present neighborhood?
a) yes (Who, specify-----------------------------)*
b) none
40. What
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
41. What
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
are the your problems in your present neighborhood?
---------------------------------------------- -
---------------------------------------------- -
---------------------------------------------- -
---------------------------------------------- -
------------------------------------------------
are the things you want to see changed in your neighborhood?
------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------
Financial Situation
42. Sources of family income
a) remittances b) employment c) vending /other services
d) donations from relatives/ friends e) pensions
43. Combined Family Income prior to relocation. pesos/ month
44. Combined Family Income after relocation. pesos/ month
45. Combined Family Expenses prior to relocation. pesos/ month
46. Combined Family Expenses after relocation. pesos/ month
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47. After coming here, do you think there is a change in your nutrition
intake?
a) yes (*better or worse; Why
b) no
48. With your income, are you able to send your children to school?
a) yes (*all children or just a few) b) no
49. With you income, are you able to meet basic comforts like clothing,
house expenses, transportation expenses, etc.?
a) yes b) no
50. Are there anything you pay more here than in Manila? (attn. to prices of
food)
a) yes b) no
51. What are the things you pay more?
1.
2.
3.
52. Are there anything you pay less here than in Manila?
a) yes b) no
53. What are the things you pay less?
1.
2.
3.
House
54. Have you made improvements from the original house constructed?
a) yes b) no
55. What improvements have you made?
a) expansion of the living and dining room
b) added bedrooms c) changed materials
d) others, specify ------------_ _ -_ __
56. Did you (or will you) receive a loan?
a) yes; specify a source and amount;
b) no
57. How much is your monthly amortization? pesos/ month
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58. Do you pay on time? a) yes
b) no, because can't afford to pay that amount
because do not have any incentive to pay
because nobody comes to collect it
others, specify 
__ __ _ ________
59. If you can choose the amount, how much do you think your family can
afford to pay? pesos/month
60. Are there obstacles to owning the land (to have land tenure)?
61. How much have you spent to improve the house?
63. How much do you think the house is worth now? pesos
64. Do you want to sell it? a) yes b) no
65. If you want to sell it, why?
66. When do you want to sell it?
67. If you do not want to sell, why?
68. Would you like to make the house better than it is now?
a) yes b) no
69. If no, w hy? __ - ____________-______
Relocation
70. When did you know that you might be relocated?
a) a year before actual relocation (or census making)
b) less than a year before actual relocation (or census making)
c) less than 3-6 months before actual relocation (or census making)
d) when census is being undertaken
e) others, specify 
___
71. How did you know that you would be relocated?
a) rumor
b) government (NHA/ DPWH/ local government)
c) barangay captain
d) others, specify __- 
______
72. What came into your mind when you first heard it?
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73. Were you given a notice?
74. If so, how long was the notice served before the relocation?
specify; 
_-__
75. Did you try not to be relocated to Dasmarifias/ FVR?
a) yes b) no
76. Why didn't you want to come here ?
77. What did you know about Dasmariias/FVR?
78. Were there discussion/ dialogues with the NHA/DPWH?
a) yes b) none
79. How frequent was the discussion?
a) once b) twice c) several times (specify )
80. Who joined these dialogues?
a) all relocatees b) barangay officials only
c) others, specify
81. Did you join any of the dialogue? a) yes b) no
82. If not, why not?
a) busy
b) timing was wrong (weekday/during working hours)
c) not interested
d) others, specify 
___-_
83. If yes, why?
a) to know more information
b) everyone else said that they would be attending
c) I was told to attend
d) others, specify 
_____-____
84. Were there any changes made in compensation package after dialogues?
a) yes (specify----------------------------------)
b) none
85. Do you feel that you and your community's needs were being heard and
reflected upon actual relocation program?
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b) noa) yes
86. If given the choice, where would you have liked to be relocated?
87. Is there anything you want to ask/ complain to NHA/ DPWH in their
way of handling the whole relocation program? What could have been
done better?
88. What do you want from NHA/DPWH?
Displacement and Relocation
89. How did you get here?
90. When did you move in? (month/year)
91. How many days did you live in a temporary housing?
92. Did any of your family continue or discontinue to work or schooling due
to the relocation? a) yes b) no
93. Was discontinuance voluntary?
a) yes
b) no (T hen w hy ?______________________________________)
94. If someone stopped working for some time, did she/ he go back to the
same job? a) yes b) no
95. If she/ he had to look for a job, how long did it take to start working?
96. How did he/she find a job? (*NHA/DPWH, barangay captain, neighbors,
relatives, NGO/PO, cooperatives)
97. If given a choice, what would you have preferred to receive:
a) cash
b) in-kind (housing materials) compensation
c) house and a lot
d) others, specify ________- 
____ -__ -___
98. Why would you prefer cash? _
99. If given cash, how do you spend it?
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Regarding Job Training ( Attn: This part will be only undertaken at DBB)
100. Are you aware that DSWD and NHA are providing job technical
training? a) yes b) no
101. Have you attended? a) yes b) no
102. If yes, did you find it helpful? a) yes b) no
103. If no, why did you not attend?
104. If you are given the opportunity to have job training, what skills would
you want to acquire? ______ ___ ______
105. If you learn the skills that you like, do you think it would be possible for
you to find a job? a) yes b) no
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